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Non-Appropriation, No Problem: 
The Outer Space Treaty Is 
Ready for Asteroid Mining 
John G. Wrench* 
Has technology outrun the international law governing 
outer space? This dilemma presents itself as private entities 
become capable of space travel and new technology makes 
asteroid mining a reality. Although the Outer Space Treaty’s 
“non-appropriation” principle prohibits nations from 
claiming sovereignty over space bodies, that restriction does 
not prevent resource extraction. The non-appropriation 
principle, interpreted alongside existing legal regimes, 
distinguishes between forbidden appropriation and permissible 
extraction. Consequently, the non-appropriation principle is 
most accurately viewed as a flexible premise from which the 
international community is free to fashion unique laws 
governing resource extraction in outer space. 
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Introduction 
In late 2017, a business magnate was busy launching reusable 
rockets into space twice a week.1 Using his recently successful 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 
Cleveland, Ohio, May 2019; B.A., Philosophy & Religious Studies, Pace 
University, Pleasantville, New York, December 2015. 
1. Jason Rhian, MEV-1 Working to Expand Spaceflight Revolution, Extend 
On-Orbit Operations, SPACEFLIGHT INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.spaceflightinsider.com/organizations/orbital-sciences-
corp/mev-1-working-expand-spaceflight-revolution-extend-on-orbit-
operations/ [https://perma.cc/R2DP-Y583].  
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technology, Elon Musk plans to put one million colonists on Mars 
within 40-100 years.2 Elsewhere, a former car salesman has made 
millions of dollars selling lunar real estate to celebrities.3 To divvy 
up the acreage, Dennis Hope closes his eyes and points to a 
diagram of the moon, coloring in the newly sold property with a 
red pen.4 Hearing of the sale, a legal scholar cites the Outer Space 
Treaty (“OST”) and opines that Hope in fact owns nothing 
because “…[n]o one can own any property in space.”5 Hope believes 
that he has found a loophole—retorting that the OST prohibits 
states, not individuals, from owning space property. 
Their debate is not merely academic. Technological 
developments of the 1960’s gave rise first to Sputnik and, in the 
ensuing years, a full-blown space race between the Soviet Union 
and the United States.6 That tension spurred the international 
community to create a series of treaties governing the uses of outer 
space, the first and chief among them being the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty (“OST”).7  
While the OST has achieved many of its goals— particularly 
by avoiding violence in space—the treaty’s drafters could not 
foresee every challenge on the horizon. Technology has advanced 
rapidly since 1967, opening up outer space to increased 
government and private speculation. Asteroids, rich in the precious 
metals used in modern technology, have become something of a 
white whale for entrepreneurs and nations alike. As technology 
yields to these goals, fewer and fewer barriers remain. 
One remaining, elusive obstacle to asteroid mining stems from 
the OST itself. Article II of the OST provides that outer space and 
celestial bodies are “…not subject to national appropriation by 
 
2. Nadia Drake, Elon Musk: In Seven Years, SpaceX Could Land Humans 
on Mars, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 29, 2017), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/09/elon-musk-spacex-mars-
moon-bfr-rockets-space-science/ [https://perma.cc/522T-22QH].   
3. Vivian Giang, The Man Who ‘Owns’ The Moon Says His Galactic 





6. See Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights 
From the Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 27 (2005) (noting that 
“[o]ther nations feared that the two rising superpowers would dominate 
space and claim it for themselves.”). 
7. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 19, 1966, 610 U.N.T.S. 8843, art. 1 [hereinafter 
OST].  
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claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means.”8 This restriction—the “non-appropriation” 
principle—means that, at a minimum, nations cannot claim 
sovereignty over celestial bodies. More controversially, some 
scholars suggest that the non-appropriation principle calls into 
doubt whether nations or businesses can “own” what they extract 
from asteroids or other space bodies.9 
Under a legal regime that forbids parties from claiming 
sovereignty over underlying land—does it necessarily follow that 
parties cannot “own” resources extracted from that land? This 
question has been the subject of debate for those seeking to define 
the scope of available property rights under the OST.10 Even if 
scholars agree that the non-appropriation principle applies equally 
to nations and their citizens, the scope of its restriction remains 
unclear.  
This Note seeks to prove that the non-appropriation principle 
is, as a restriction on sovereign claims to land, no obstacle to outer 
space resource extraction. To prove that claim, Part I briefly 
walks through the history of space law. Part I continues by 
exploring competing interpretations of the non-appropriation 
principle, concluding that the non-appropriation principle is a 
narrow ban on actual claims of sovereignty, allowing an (albeit 
undefined) degree of ownership in extracted resources. Part II 
employs a different methodology than that used in related work on 
this subject, by showing that a robust system of rights in 
extracted resources is achievable, beginning with the non-
appropriation principle’s restriction. To that end, Part II identifies 
three legal regimes that share the non-appropriation principle’s 
ban on sovereign claims, yet permit the ownership of extracted 
resources. The Note concludes that the non-appropriation principle 
is a useful and nuanced constraint, rather than a ban, on nations 
 
8. Id. at art. 2.  
9. See Virgiliu Pop, Appropriation in Outer Space: The Relationship 
Between Land Ownership and Sovereignty on the Celestial Bodies, 16 
SPACE POL’Y 275, 276 (2000) (discussing the impact of the non-
appropriation principle of the Outer Space Treaty on landed property 
rights of celestial bodies); see also Fabio Tronchetti, The Non-
Appropriation Principle as a Structural Norm of International Law: A 
New Way of Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 AIR & 
SPACE L. 277, 278-282 (2008) (arguing for the need to safeguard the 
non-appropriative nature of outer space and view the principle as a 
customary rule of international law). 
10. Andrew Tingkang, These Aren’t the Asteroids You Are Looking For: 
Classifying Asteroids in Space as Chattels, Not Land, 35 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 559, 573 (2012) (“[T]hough there is no national appropriation, 
there is an open question of what processes are available for 
appropriation by other means.”).  
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and businesses’ abilities to establish property rights in extracted 
resources. 
I. International Treaties, National Ambitions, and the “Non-
Appropriation” Principle 
This part briefly frames the history of space law and considers 
various interpretations of the non-appropriation principle. To 
examine the scope of property rights available under the non-
appropriation principle, we must first address whether it permits 
any ownership, and whether it applies to both nations and their 
businesses. After the restrictions of the non-appropriation principle 
are clearer, the following sections will explore what other property 
regimes have established within those same restrictions. 
A. International and National Laws Governing the Use of Outer 
Space 
Despite the novelty of outer space, the treaties governing it are 
unmistakably preoccupied with the era’s reoccurring worries. Plagued 
by Cold War tensions, the several international treaties governing the 
use of outer space reflect tensions between the United States and 
former Soviet Union.11 Like other treaties created in the aftermath of 
World War II, one of the international community’s chief concerns 
was to prevent space from becoming a setting for nuclear conflict.12  
The first agreement, the “Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”—known informally as 
the Outer Space Treaty (“OST”)—emphasizes the restriction on 
nuclear weapons in space.13 Furthermore, the OST states that the 
exploration and use of outer space “…shall be the province of all 
mankind” and that states have “free access to all areas” of outer 
space.”14 The OST makes nations liable for actions of the 
 
11. See, e.g., Andrew R. Brehm, Private Property in Outer Space: 
Establishing a Foundation for Future Exploration, 33 WIS. INT’L L. J. 
353, 357 (2015) (“Modern international space law can be traced back to 
the Cold War and the intensive space race between the United States 
and the Soviet Union.”). 
12. Id. (describing the space race as “…the opportunity for either 
superpower to gain a leg up and end the geopolitical stalemate.”).  
13. OST, supra note 7, at art. 4 (“State Parties to the Treaty undertake not 
to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons 
or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons 
on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other 
manner.”).  
14. Id. at art. 1.  
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governmental and non-governmental entities they launch into space.15 
Article II of the OST is of particular importance to our discussion 
because it contains the non-appropriation principle, which states that 
outer space “…is not subject to national appropriation by claim of 
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation by any other means.”16  
After the OST, four treaties developed international law to 
address particular issues. The Rescue Agreement was negotiated in 
1967 and sets forth nations’ shared responsibilities to rescue 
astronauts in distress within their own territories and to similarly 
inform the Secretary General of the United Nations of spacecraft in 
distress.17 The Liability Convention outlines a liability regime in 
which nations that launch an object—”launching states”—are liable 
for damage caused by that object.18 The Registration Convention 
requires states to provide the United Nations with details about each 
launched object’s orbit and function.19 
The last of these is the Moon Agreement,20 which failed to gain 
international support.21 The spacefaring nations’ primary reason for 
rejecting the Moon Agreement is its moratorium on resource 
appropriation.22 Article 11 provides:  
Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the Moon, nor any 
part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property 
of any State, international intergovernmental or non-
 
15. Id. at art. 7 (imposing “international liability” on parties to the treaty 
who launch objects which cause damage).   
16. Id. at art. 2.   
17. G.A. Res. 22/2345, Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return 
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(Dec. 19, 1967) [hereinafter Rescue Agreement].  
18. G.A. Res. 26/2777, Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects (Nov. 29, 1971) [hereinafter Liability 
Convention].  
19. G.A. Res. 29/3235, Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space (Nov. 12, 1974) [hereinafter Registration Convention].  
20. G.A. Res. 34/68, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Dec. 5, 1979) [hereinafter Moon 
Agreement]. 
21. See Brehm, supra note 11, at 359 (stating that the Moon Agreement’s 
effect “…has been extremely limited…due to an absence of key 
signatories—neither the United States nor Russia has ratified the [Moon 
Agreement]…merely sixteen nations are signatories…”). 
22. See, e.g., Sattler, supra note 6, at 30 (noting that the Moon Agreement 
has not been widely accepted because it “further restricts ownership and 
prohibits any property rights until an international body is created.”). 
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governmental organization, national organization or non-
governmental entity or of any natural person.23 
The Moon Agreement has not been ratified by any spacefaring 
nation and consequently has “little influence in international law.”24 
Since the Moon Agreement’s failure, nations and businesses have 
developed supplemental national policy and expressed ambitions to 
benefit from space exploration.25 
Concurrent developments in national space policy provide insight 
into how some nations interpret the scope of rights available under 
the non-appropriation principle. In 2015, the United States passed the 
“Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship 
(SPACE) Act of 2015 (“SPACE Act of 2015”).26 The SPACE Act of 
2015 asserts that citizens of the United States are “entitled to any 
asteroid resource or space resource obtained…in accordance with 
applicable law, including the international obligations of the United 
States.”27 Former-Representative Jim Bridenstine’s “American Space 
Renaissance Act”28 aimed to overhaul the nation’s space 
infrastructure by creating the “Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation” and establishing performance-based regulations.29 
More recently, Bridenstine was nominated by President Trump to be 
the 13th NASA Administrator, and was confirmed on April 23, 2018.30 
NASA’s goals under Bridenstine have included public-private 
cooperation, long-term plans for settlements, and stabilized 
infrastructure for launches.31  These national policies have 
 
23. Moon Agreement, supra note 20, at art. 11.  
24. Tingkang, supra note 10, at 572.  
25. See RAM S. JAKHU & JOSEPH N. PELTON, GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: 
AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY (2017) (discussing the regulatory policies and 
issues of space and potential improvements to global space 
governance).   
26. H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015-2016).  
27. Id. at §51303.  
28. H.R. 4945, 114th Cong. (2015-2016).  
29. See Michael Listner, An Overview of the American Space Renaissance 
Act (Part 3), THE SPACE REVIEW (May 9, 2016), 
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2980/1 (giving an overview of 
the American Space Renaissance Act). 
30. NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine, NASA Leadership, NASA (Apr. 
23, 2018), https://www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/bridenstine-
biography.html.  
31. See Alan Boyle, NASA Lays Out its Commercial Roadmap for Putting 
Astronauts on the Moon in 2028, YAHOO! (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.yahoo.com/news/nasa-lays-commercial-roadmap-putting-
233352611.html. In line with these plans, Bridenstine recently stated, 
“This time, when we go to the moon, we’re actually going to stay . . . 
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consequently paved the way for a paradigm shift, which highlights the 
central role of businesses in space exploration. 
Promoting business activity in outer space through policy is one 
method nations have employed to harness the entrepreneurial 
capacity of businesses. For example, some states have devised 
favorable local tax schemes as a means to encourage businesses to 
launch space objects within the state’s jurisdiction.32 These efforts 
stem from the observation that businesses’ capacity for innovation is 
a leading factor in an ongoing paradigm shift to “new space”—risk-
taking, ambitious businesses whose technology has prepared them to 
take the reins from the slow, top-down “old space” headed by 
NASA.33  
And, ambitious they are. U.S.-based businesses like Planetary 
Resources and Deep Space Industries have plans to profit from space 
mining.34 Scientists believe that asteroids and other celestial objects 
are abundant with precious metals, including those used to create a 
wide range of technology.35 In January of 2018, Planetary Resources 
accomplished a step in its resource mining plans, by launching a 
satellite capable of detecting water. Because water can be used to 
create rocket-fuel, identifying water on asteroids would essentially 
create “launch pads for long distance travel.”36 Similarly, Deep Space 
Industries plans to launch a spacecraft capable of prospecting near-
 
[w]e’re not going to leave flags and footprints and then come home, to 
not go back for another 50 years.” Id. 
32. See, e.g., Debra Werner, California Eyes Launch Income Regulation, 
Not a New Tax, SPACENEWS (May 9, 2017), 
http://spacenews.com/california-eyes-launch-income-regulation-not-a-
new-tax/ (discussing California’s potential tax scheme that would 
remove income tax for in-state launches that arise from out-of-state 
contracts).  
33. Joel Achenback, Which Way to Space? Flights of Fancy May Launch 
the Industry’s Future, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2013/11/23/which-way-
to-space/?utm_term=.6aad500dad76. 
34. See Dylan Taylor, Maximising the Economic Opportunities of Deep 
Space, ROOM (2017), https://room.eu.com/article/maximising-the-
economic-opportunities-of-deep-space (identifying Planetary Resources 
and Deep Space Industries as the “most notable” deep space companies, 
both of which have shifted from the goal of purely asteroid mining to 
the broader goal of mining “space resources”).  
35. Joseph T. Miller & David Teague Coit, Lunar Property and Mining 
Rights (Aug. 2008) (unpublished B.S. thesis, Worchester Polytechnic 
Institute) (on file with Digital WPI). 
36. Melody M. Bomgardner, Chris Lewicki is Aiming at Asteroids to 
Launch a New Era of Space Travel, C&EN (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://cen.acs.org/articles/96/i9/Chris-Lewicki-is-aiming-at-asteroids-
to-launch-a-new-era-of-space-travel.html.  
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Earth asteroids for valuable resources.37 In response to what it deems 
“some misunderstanding,” the Deep Space Industries’ general counsel 
has reassured the international community that the non-appropriation 
principle prohibits ownership—not the “use”38—of celestial bodies.  
Luxembourg interprets the OST similarly. In 2017, it passed a law 
granting businesses operating within its jurisdiction rights in resources 
extracted in outer space.39 Through the law, Luxembourg plans to 
invest at least $230 million to encourage businesses to establish offices 
within its jurisdiction.40 The plan seems to be working: Planetary 
Resources applauded the law as a step towards “stability and 
predictability” for asteroid mining,41 while Deep Space Industries’ 
prospecting spacecraft will now be co-funded by Luxembourg.42 
B. Defining the Non-Appropriation Principle 
The non-appropriation principle’s definition is the starting point 
for determining whether it permits resource extraction. For 
commentators who do not reject an interpretation permitting resource 
extraction outright, many more are, at the very least, skeptical.43 
Indeed, one scholar has argued that interpretations of the OST that 
 
37. Deep Space Industries, Prospecter-1: First Commercial Interplanetary 
Mining Mission, PHYS.ORG (Aug. 10, 2016), 
https://phys.org/news/2016-08-prospector-1first-commercial-
interplanetary-mission.html (noting that the spacecraft will “fly to and 
rendezvous with a near-Earth asteroid, and investigate the object to 
determine its value as a source of space resources.”). 
38. Sagi Kfir, Is Asteroid Mining Legal?, LINKEDIN (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/asteroid-mining-legal-sagi-kfir.  
39. Jeff Foust, Luxembourg Adopts Space Resource Law, SPACENEWS (July 
17, 2017), http://spacenews.com/luxembourg-adopts-space-resources-
law/ (stating that part of the law’s first article translates as: “[s]pace 
resources are capable of being appropriated.”).  
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Emily Calandrelli, Deep Space Industries Partners with Luxembourg to 
Test Asteroid Mining Technologies, TECHCRUNCH (May 5, 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/05/deep-space-industries-partners-
with-luxembourg-to-test-asteroid-mining-technologies/ (Luxembourg’s 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economy, Étienne 
Schneider, stated that the partnership “…clearly demonstrates the strong 
commitment of the Luxembourg Government to support the exploration 
and future use of space resources.”).  
43. Sarah Fecht, Space Mining Bill Passes in Congress, POPULAR SCIENCE 
(Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.popsci.com/congress-approves-space-
mining-bill (mentioning that, in 2015, the founder of Space Law and 
Policy Solutions, Michael Listner, stated that “…[a]cademia is pretty 
much split right down the middle on this…[w]hen you have that much 
dissent, you have to talk about it.”).  
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allow ownership of space material twists Article II’s actual language 
for the purposes of justifying commercial ambitions.44 The non-
appropriation principle’s succinct prohibition presents additional 
interpretive issues because it omits reference to the role of non-
governmental entities.45 Consequently, two questions arising from the 
OST are whether the non-appropriation principle applies equally to 
nations and their businesses; and, what the scope of that restriction 
is.  
First, while the OST only explicitly restricts nations from making 
sovereign claims, it would be paradoxical to permit businesses to 
freely violate their own nations’ international obligations. The OST 
holds nations liable for damages caused by objects launched within 
the nation’s jurisdiction.46 The Liability Convention explicates this 
idea, clarifying that nations are “absolutely liable” for damages caused 
by space objects launched within their jurisdiction if that damage is 
caused “on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.”47 If that 
damage is caused elsewhere, a launching state is liable “only if the 
damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is 
responsible.”48 Furthermore, the international community’s emphasis 
on the peaceful use of outer space conflicts with an interpretation of 
the OST that would allow private individuals to violate its other 
prohibitions.49 As one scholar noted, such an interpretation of the  
44. Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the Global Public Interest in Outer 
Space, 32 J. SPACE L. 31, 33-46 (2006) (noting that during the 1976 
First Committee of the UN General Assembly the representatives from 
both Belgium and France shared the view that the OST 
“prohibit[ed]…any claim of sovereignty or property rights in space” and 
that “growing pressure by a number of countries for increased 
privatization, commercialization, deregulation, and globalization, along 
with recent changes in the global geopolitical situation, are creating 
disturbing disagreements about the interpretation of the [OST], its 
implementation, and the direction of future legal development.”).  
45. Bryon C. Brittingham, Does The World Really Need New Space Law?, 
12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 31, 38 (2010) (noting that “[n]one of [the OST] 
directly or indirectly speaks to appropriation by private entities.”).  
46. OST, supra note 7, at art. 7 (stating that each launching state “is 
internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty 
or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component 
parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies.”).  
47. Liability Convention, supra note 19, at art. 2. 
48. Id. at art. 3.  
49. See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 
180 (2014) (“The goal of avoiding military confrontations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union would have been impaired if private 
citizens of either state were permitted to claim private ownership of 
celestial land. This process would inevitably produce conflicting title 
claims, leading to increased tension and the risk of armed conflict.”). 
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OST permits counter-intuitive outcomes in which the international 
community prohibits a nation, but not a nation’s private entities, 
from installing nuclear weapons on the moon.50 An alternate 
interpretation would allow nations to “avoid their obligations” by 
acting vicariously through their private businesses.51  
A further consequence of an interpretation allowing private-actor 
exemption from the OST is that such “rights” would be effectively 
unenforceable.52 In 2003, a brave U.S. citizen shouldered the quixotic 
mission to test that idea, asserting that after NASA landed on his 
asteroid it, naturally, owed him parking and storage fees of 20 cents 
per year.53 Greg Nemitz claimed to have acquired those property 
rights when he registered the asteroid, named “Eros,” with the 
Archimedes Institute—a website allowing visitors to register space 
objects.54 The district court rejected Nemitz’s claim that NASA’s use 
of Eros amounted to a takings under the Fifth Amendment.55 Noting 
that a takings claim requires “a constitutionally protected property 
interest,” which Nemitz had not established by registering Eros, the 
court held that he had failed to state a legally cognizable theory for 
relief.56 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Nemitz instead argued that 
his “inalienable rights” as a “natural Man” justified ownership.57 In 
one paragraph, the Ninth Circuit tersely rejected that argument, 
affirming the district court’s ruling.58 At the very least, the United 
 
50. Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for Exploitation of Outer 
Space Mineral Resources, 88 NEB. L. REV. 794, 806-07 (2010) (“[I]t 
would be absurd to contend that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which 
does not mention private entities, thereby allows a state to license a 
private entity to conduct nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in 
outer space, or under water.”). 
51. Id. at 807. 
52. See Brehm, supra note 11, at 360 (noting that private parties will not 
be capable of “sustain[ing] successful commercial outer space material 
extraction enterprises” without governments’ willingness to enforce 
those rights). 
53. Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM, 2004 WL 3167042 (D. 
Nev. 2004). For a full discussion on Nemitz’s legal arguments and their 
rejection, see generally Robert Kelly, Nemitz v. United States, A Case 
of First Impression: Appropriation, Private Property Rights and Space 
Law Before the Federal Courts of the United States, 30 J. SPACE L. 297 
(2004). 
54. Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042, at 1.  
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Appellant’s Informal Brief at 7-9, Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-
N030599-HDM, 2004 WL 3167042 (D. Nev. 2004) (No. 04-16223). 
58. Nemitz v. N.A.S.A., 126 F. App’x. 343 (9th Cir. 2005). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Non-Appropriation, No Problem 
447 
States rejects the idea that its own citizens may enforce ownership of 
bodies in outer space without national recognition of those rights.  
Secondly, even if nations, businesses, and individuals are equally 
bound by the non-appropriation principle, the scope of that restriction 
is not entirely clear from the text of Article II.59 It is unlikely, 
however, that the non-appropriation principle is an absolute ban on 
the ownership of resources extracted in outer space. 
An interpretation of Article II supporting a blanket ban on 
resource ownership is unwarranted by the text of the OST and ill-
founded on account of the international community’s common 
practices. Scholars have noted that the international community has 
never questioned whether scientific samples harvested from celestial 
bodies belong to the extracting nation.60 Furthermore, space-faring 
members of the international community rejected the Moon Treaty 
precisely because it prohibited all forms of ownership in resources 
extracted from celestial bodies.61 The space-faring nations’ support for 
the OST, coupled with their rejection of an alternative set of rules 
governing extracted resources, is at the very least an indication of 
what those nations believe the non-appropriation principle to stand 
for.  
It is equally improbable that the international community drafted 
the non-appropriation principle to be merely idealistic rhetoric. The 
OST leaves no room for interpretations to squirm out from under its 
ban on sovereign claims of land.62 The following section illustrates, 
however, that the distinction between sovereign ownership of land, 
and the vestment of property rights in resources extracted from that 
land, is nothing new.  
 
59. See Kevin MacWhorter, Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid 
Mining, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 645, 661 (2016) 
(noting that while the OST explicitly prohibits the ownership of real 
property, it does not mention or define “extracted materials” and does 
not rule such ownership out).  
60. See Matthew Schaefer, Property Rights in Space (Part II): Post-
NewSpace Conference Thoughts- Posey ASTEROIDS Act, Bigelow 
Payload Safety Review, On-Orbit Jurisdiction, Etc., LAW OF SCHAEFER 
(July 26, 2014), https://lawofschaefer.com/2014/07/26/property-rights-
in-space-part-ii-post-newspace-conference-thoughts-posey-asteroids-act-
bigelow-payload-safety-review-on-orbit-jurisdiction-etc/ (stating that 
“[t]here should be no debate over this” because of the “numerous” 
examples of resource samples being “returned to Earth and owned by 
the extracting nation and even sold in some cases.”). 
61. See Brehm, supra note 11, at 359. 
62. OST, supra note 7 (stating that appropriation is prohibited “…by claim 
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation by any other means.”). 
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II. Legal Regimes Distinguishing Resource Extraction 
from Appropriation 
Although the OST does not provide a comprehensive guideline for 
resource extraction in outer space, its foundational logic provides a 
workable distinction between ownership and use. This part explores 
three property regimes developed under the same fundamental 
constraints as the non-appropriation principle: the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), the Antarctica 
Treaty System, and the prior appropriation doctrine as applied in 
United States water law.63 Under each regime, parties may establish 
some form of ownership in extracted resources despite being restricted 
from claiming sovereignty over the underlying land.    
Each section includes a brief discussion of the property regime’s 
history, its major traits and their relationship to the overarching 
characteristics of the non-appropriation principle. This part further 
describes how each property regime fits within the non-appropriation 
principle’s prohibition on claims to land, while prohibiting waste, 
separating land ownership from rights to extracted resources, 
enforcing liability for destruction or damage, and establishing a simple 
regulatory system to manage claims. 
A. The Law(s) of the Sea: UNCLOS and the Seabed Act 
International and national maritime laws addressing resource 
extraction deal with many of the same obstacles present in outer 
space. Like outer space, “[t]he seabed is rich in minerals…[c]ollecting 
and mining these minerals is expensive and requires sophisticated 
technology capable of reaching the great depths.”64 Additionally, the 
international regulatory regime created to address seabed mining 
contemplates widely applicable issues including the “protection and 
preservation of the marine environment,” “promot[ing] the peaceful 
uses of the seas and oceans,” and the “efficient utilization” of the 
 
63. Other scholars have analogized UNCLOS and the Antarctic Treaty 
System to the law of outer space as models for potential development. 
See, e.g., Barbara Ellen Heim, Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral 
Resources: A Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep 
Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 
845 (1990). This Note, however, asserts that those property regimes 
share the same doctrinal foundations as the non-appropriation principle, 
and therefore are useful for a different purpose—to determine the scope 
of rights available in extracted resources under the non-appropriation 
principle. In other words, this Note uses those regimes as examples of 
what scope of property rights in extracted resources the non-
appropriation principle already permits. 
64. Sattler, supra note 6, at 34. 
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resources therein.65 Although international law forms the backbone of 
seabed mining regulations, individual nations have concurrently 
developed their own regulations.  
The foremost international maritime law is the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).66 The current 
iteration of UNCLOS came into force in 1982, replacing decades of 
international treaties that had not addressed seabed mining.67 The 
1982 UNCLOS established the International Seabed Authority 
(“ISA”), a body responsible for managing seabed mining through 
regulations and licensing.68 UNCLOS further established a dispute 
resolution system through the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the 
International Tribunal.69 
The United States found some features of the 1982 UNCLOS 
objectionable. Originally, the ISA was empowered to create an entity 
called the “Enterprise”, which would conduct mining operations for 
the benefit of developing countries alongside private mining 
operations.70 Under this agreement, private businesses were compelled 
to provide the Enterprise with the location of discovered minerals and 
the technology necessary to extract them, all in addition to the 
funding from member states.71 Some of these requirements proved 
controversial. 
Several developed nations subsequently rejected UNCLOS and 
signed the “Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed 
Matters” (“The Provisional Understanding”) in 1984.72 The 
Provisional Understanding established “…procedures to follow in order 
to avoid overlapping claims to seabed sites,” while encouraging 
reciprocal recognition of other party’s claims.73 The Group of 77—a 
 
65. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea preamble, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
66. See id. 
67. The U.N. had drafted deep-sea regulations since the 1950’s, “…but these 
documents did not deal with undersea mining because the necessary 




71. Brittingham, supra note 45, at 52 (“Thus, the Enterprise would be given 
all of the advantages and none of the expenses of prospecting or 
developing the technology.”). 
72. Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Matters, Sept. 2, 
1984, TIAS 11066. Parties to the Provisional Understanding included 
Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.  
73. BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 258 
(2005). 
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coalition of developing countries—and the ISA, criticized the 
Provisional Understanding on the grounds that it established an 
illegal regime.74 As one critic concedes, however, the Provisional 
Understanding is probably legal because it “…neither claims 
sovereignty or ownership…nor grants exclusive rights…” to seabed 
areas.75  
UNCLOS was renegotiated in 1994, in part due to the changes 
brought about by the end of the Cold War and decreased focus on 
deep-seabed mining.76 Among the changes, it secured permanent seats 
on the ISA Council for the United States and Russia,77 created a 
Finance Committee consisting of the five parties with the largest 
financial contributions,78 removed mandatory funding of the 
Enterprise,79 made technology-sharing optional,80 and made 
development plans a prerequisite for granting permits for resource 
mining.81 Despite these changes, the United States “remains the only 
major seafaring nation” that has not ratified 1994 Agreement.82  
 
74. Declaration of the Preparatory Commission, U.N. Dᴏᴄ. LOS/PCN/72 
(Sept. 2, 1985) (“Any claim, agreement or action regarding the Area and 
its resources undertaken outside the Preparatory Commission which is 
incompatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and its related resolutions shall not be recognized…[the Preparatory 
Commission] [r]ejects such claim, agreement or action as a basis for 
creating legal rights and regards it as wholly illegal.”). 
75. Steven J. Molitor, The Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep 
Seabed Matters: An Ill-Conceived Regime for U.S. Deep Seabed Mining, 
20 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 223, 243 (1987). 
76. See Brittingham, supra note 45.  
77. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at Art. 161.  
78. Id. at Annex. § 9 (“Until the Authority has sufficient funds…the 
membership of the Committee shall include representatives of the five 
largest financial contributors to the administrative budget of the 
Authority.”). 
79. Id. at Annex. § 2 (“The obligation of States Parties to fund one mine 
site of the Enterprise…shall not apply and States Parties shall be under 
no obligation to finance any operations in any mine site of the 
Enterprise or under its joint-venture arrangements.”).  
80. Id. at Annex. § 5 (“The Enterprise, and developing States…shall seek to 
obtain [deep seabed mining technology] on fair and reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions on the open market, or through joint-
venture arrangements…”). 
81. Id. at Annex. § 6 (requiring parties to submit an “exploitation plan” 
that includes an “anticipated production schedule” estimating the 
maximum amount of extracted resources per year under the plain). 
82. David Widgerow, Boldly Going Where No Realtor Has Gone Before: 
The Law of Outer Space and a Proposal for a New Interplanetary 
Property Law System, 28 WIS. INT’L L. J. 490, 506 (2010).  
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The United States’ disagreements with the 1982 UNCLOS led to 
the creation of an interim national law called the Deep Seabed Hard 
Mineral Resources Act (“Seabed Act”).83 While the Seabed Act is 
intended as a temporary regime, it acknowledges that a functional 
international regime may take some time to develop.84 Under the 
Seabed Act, companies are required to obtain licenses and permits to 
explore and extract, both of which expire after a period of years.85 
The United States has not entirely abandoned UNCLOS. 
Addressing recent conflicts in the South China Sea, President Trump 
called for “…claimants to clarify and comport their maritime claims in 
accordance with the international law of the sea as reflected in the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea…”86 
Additionally, several United States presidents have supported 
ratification of UNCLOS since the 1994 Agreement.87 And, although 
President Reagan was dissatisfied with the 1982 UNCLOS, changes 
incorporated into the 1994 Agreement have addressed those 
complaints.88  
 
83. 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (2018) [hereinafter Seabed Act]. 
84. Id. at § 1401(a)(8) (“[I]t is in the national interest of the United States 
and other nations to encourage a widely acceptable Law of the Sea 
Treaty, which will provide a new legal order for the oceans covering a 
broad range of ocean interests, including exploration for and commercial 
recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed….”). 
85. Id. at § 1417(a)-(b) (“[e]ach license for exploration shall be issued for a 
period of 10 years…[e]ach permit for commercial recovery shall be issued 
for a term of 20 years and for so long thereafter as hard mineral 
resources are recovered annually in commercial quantities from the area 
to which the recovery plan associated with the permit applies.”). 
86. Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 12, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-
united-states-america-socialist-republic-vietnam/; but see Mark J. 
Valencia, Parsing Trump’s Recent Policy Statements on the South 
China Sea, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/parsing-trumps-recent-policy-
statements-on-the-south-china-sea/ (referring to President Trump’s 
statements as “disingenuous” because of the United States’ non-
ratification of UNCLOS). 
87. Support also includes five former Secretaries of States. See Henry 
Kissinger, George Shultz, James Baker III, Colin Powel & Condoleezza 
Rice, Time to Join the Law of the Sea Treaty, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 
2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230367400457743477085
1478912 [https://perma.cc/9P8R-BCY2] (“Presidents Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush have supported ratification, as do Presidents H.W. 
Bush and Barack Obama, because it is in the best interest of our 
nation.”). 
88. George Shultz served as Secretary of State under President Reagan and 
noted, “[i]t surprises me to learn that opponents of the treaty are 
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The laws regulating resource extraction in the sea share major 
traits with the non-appropriation principle, as UNCLOS and the 
Seabed Act allow parties to establish property rights in extracted 
resources without violating the non-appropriation principle. First, 
under both regimes, parties extract minerals without laying claim to 
underlying land.89 Secondly, UNCLOS’s requirement for development 
plans and the Seabed Act’s licensing-system place some pressure on 
parties to extract resources or forfeit their rights.90 This feature 
prevents parties from sleeping on a license, thereby encouraging 
productive use of land. In other words, the licensing system reduces 
waste and protects against de facto ownership of land resulting from 
inordinately long periods of occupation. The United States, by 
adopting both traits from UNCLOS, and voicing its willingness to 
enter into a robust international regime for resource extraction, 
indicates support for an international regime reflecting those features.  
Even if the United States’ framework under the Seabed Act were 
adopted as a model for resource extraction in space, it comports with 
the non-appropriation principle. The United States’ conceptual 
distinction between land ownership and resource extraction is a gauge 
for whether it would accept a similar arrangement for space law.91 
And, while the United States is only one of many members of the 
international community, it is difficult to conceive of a successful 
international agreement without the involvement of the major space-
faring nations. 
B. The Antarctic Treaty System 
The Antarctic Treaty92 and the subsequent agreements 
collectively regulating the peaceful use of Antarctica form the  
invoking President Reagan’s name, arguing that he would have opposed 
ratification despite having succeeded on the deep sea-bed issue. During 
his administration, with full clearance and support from President 
Reagan, we made it very clear that we would support ratification if our 
position on the sea-bed issue were accepted.”  
89. See UNCLOS, supra note 65, at Art. 89 (“No State may validly purport 
to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.”); see also Seabed 
Act, supra note 83, at § 1402 (a)(2) (clarifying that the Seabed Act 
“does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or 
jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any areas or resources in the deep 
seabed.”).  
90. See Sattler, supra note 6, at 36 (stating that “[s]uch a provision ensures 
development of the area instead of dormant claims that leave an area 
unproductive.”).  
91. Seabed Act, supra note 83, at § 1412(b)(3) (a valid license entitles the 
license-holder only to “recover hard mineral resources, and to own, 
transport, use, and sell” those extracted resources).  
92. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 
[hereinafter The Antarctic Treaty]. 
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“Antarctic Treaty System.”93 The first of these treaties was created in 
1959 to preserve environmental integrity and prohibit violence in the 
region.94 Antarctica’s size, impenetrableness, and vast resource stores 
have made it a reoccurring model for outer space law.95 While the 
Antarctic Treaty System shares key features with the law of outer 
space, its development and subsequent legal regime is distinctive. 
Several nations made property claims to Antarctica before the 
first Antarctic Treaty.96 Parties suspended those claims, however, in 
effort to moderate claims and prevent Antarctica from becoming a 
site of violent competition.97 Although the 1959 Antarctic Treaty does 
not directly address resource-mining, parties “…understood that the 
question of how Antarctic mineral activity was to be regulated…would 
not go away.”98 
The international community originally attempted to establish a 
legal regime for Antarctica that distinguished between sovereign 
claims and resource extraction. The Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Act (“CRAMRA”) was the first venture 
to provide a foundation for an international property regime in 
Antarctica.99 CRAMRA defined, as a means to regulate resource 
 
93. Key Documents of the Antarctic Treaty System, SECRETARIAT OF THE 
ANTARCTIC TREATY, https://www.ats.aq/e/ats_keydocs.htm 
[https://perma.cc/F22J-TK3Q] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
94. See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 92, at Article IX (stating that two 
of the Antarctic Treaty’s goals are the “preservation and conservation of 
living resources in Antarctica” and the “use of Antarctica for peaceful 
purposes only.”). 
95. See Sattler, supra note 6, at 32 (“Like the moon, Mars, and asteroids, 
the continent of Antarctica is also a vast expanse of land that is 
undeveloped and contains mineral deposits. The development and 
utilization of Antarctica, like the development of these celestial bodies, 
is expensive, requires great technical innovations, and provides unique 
challenges to humans working in that environment.”). 
96. Blake Gilson, Defending Your Client’s Property Rights in Space: A 
Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 
1386 (2011) (“[S]even countries successively claimed sovereignty in 
Antarctic territory” in the century after they discovered that Antarctica 
was a continent rather than a “patchwork of ice islands . . . .”). 
97. Sattler, supra note 6, at 32 (“[C]laims were then suspended by the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959 in favor of a legal regime that protected the 
fragile environment and fostered scientific research in the region.”). 
98. Introductory Note, U.S. State Dep’t, Regulation of Antarctica Mineral 
Resource Activities, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15282.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/D73C-HB6L] (hereinafter Antarctica Mineral Resource 
Introductory Note). 
99. See A.D. Watts, The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Mineral Resource Activities 1988, 39 THE INT’L AND COMP. L. Q. 169, 
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mining, three categories of resource-related activity: “prospecting”, 
“exploration”, and “development.”100 The Regulatory Committee, one 
of several institutions established under CRAMRA, was responsible 
for considering permit applications for the “exploration and 
development” of mineral resources.101 Unlike exploration and 
development, prospecting does not require the authorization of any of 
the institutions.102 
CRAMRA’s definition of “prospecting” is crucial for 
understanding the role of property rights under the regime. 
Prospecting includes the investigation of areas for potential 
exploration or development using a variety of sensing technologies.103 
Dredging, excavation, or drilling, however, are defined as 
“prospecting” only if used for the purpose of obtaining small-scale 
samples or drilling less than 25 metres.104 Furthermore, activities 
defined as “prospecting” do not confer property rights to mineral 
resources.105 As a result, an operator gains property rights to mineral 
resources “…at the exact point where prospecting activities cease to be 
prospecting activities and become exploration or development 
activities.”106 
The six years of negotiation that culminated in CRAMRA107 were 
not ultimately fruitful. Under its terms, CRAMRA could not enter 
into force unless all states with territorial claims to Antarctica were 
parties to it.108 Australia and France, while supportive of CRAMRA 
during negotiations, stated in 1989 that they would not ratify the 
Convention.109 Consequently, no nations have ratified CRAMRA.110 
 
169-70 (1990). Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868 [hereinafter CRAMRA]. 
100. Id. at 869. 
101. Id. at 883. 
102. See id. 
103. Id. at 869. 
104. Id. 
105. Elliot Reaven, The United States Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act: The Creation of Private Space Property Rights 
and the Omission of the Right to Free from Harmful Interference, 94 
WASH. U. L. REV. 238, 253-4 (“[T]he extracting entity has a right to 
property as soon as its excavations and dredging are no longer for the 
purpose of obtaining “small-scale samples” or when its drilling extends 
to depths below twenty-five meters.”). 
106. Id. at 254. 
107. Id. at 251.  
108. Antarctica Mineral Resource Introductory Note, supra note 98. 
109. For the series of events leading up to Australia’s rejection of CRAMRA, 
including pleas from Jacques Cousteau and the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
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Antarctic resource extraction is currently regulated under the 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, also 
known as the “Madrid Protocol”.111 Concluded in 1991, the Madrid 
Protocol prohibits “…[a]ny activity relating to mineral resources, other 
than scientific research…”112 Parties to the Madrid Protocol are able 
to reconsider the ban on commercial resource mining in 2048 and have 
reaffirmed the moratorium as recently as 2016.113  
Although it was not ultimately adopted, CRAMRA’s negotiation 
provides insight into the international community’s willingness to 
create a resource extraction regime starting from a premise that 
ownership and use are distinct. Although CRAMRA permitted 
nations to extract resources, extraction explicitly could not amount to 
ownership of the underlying land.114 From that premise, CRAMRA 
does not grant property rights to parties who have merely used 
sensing technologies on the land, requiring more significant labor 
through activities like drilling or dredging.115  
While the Madrid Protocol removes commercial resource 
extraction as an option, it allows nations to extract scientific samples 
without requiring—or permitting—claims of sovereignty.116 Because 
the Madrid Protocol “neither modif[ies] nor amends” the framework 
laid out by the Antarctic Treaty,117 extraction—whether scientific or 
commercial—remains separate from the ownership of underlying land. 
While the international community chose to restrict commercial 
extraction in Antarctica, that arrangement is a result of 
 
see Sam Blay & Ben M. Tsamenyi, Australia and the Convention for the 
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), 26 
POLAR RECORD 195, 198 (1990).  
110. Antarctica Mineral Resource Introductory Note, supra note 98. 
111. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455 [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]. 
112. Id. at 1464. 
113. Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, Resolution 6 (2016) ATCM XXXIX 
– CEP XIX, Santiago (June 1, 2016), 
https://www.ats.aq/devAS/info_measures_listitem.aspx?lang=e&id=64
2 [https://perma.cc/65BP-MGUS] (“[T]he [Madrid Protocol]…is an 
essential element of current efforts to protect the Antarctic 
environment…”). 
114. CRAMRA, supra note 99, at 874 (“Nothing in this Convention and no 
acts or activities taking place while this Convention is in force shall . . . 
. constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to 
territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty area or create any rights 
of sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty area . . . .”). 
115. See Seabed Act, supra note 83. 
116. Madrid Protocol, supra note 111, 30 I.L.M. at 1464. 
117. Id. at 1463. 
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environmental concerns and not the failure to develop a property 
regime.118 CRAMRA’s successful illustration of a property regime 
remains instructive for the international community as it develops 
finer points of space law.  
C. The Prior Appropriation Doctrine 
The prior appropriation doctrine is a system developed in the 
American West to simplify miners’ water claims, granting rights to 
use the water to whoever made beneficial use of it first.119 The prior 
appropriation doctrine is useful for analyzing the law of outer space in 
both functional and abstract ways. First, scientists expect that water 
will be necessary for creating fuel and breathable air in outer space.120 
Secondly, the prior appropriation doctrine evolved to resolve various 
claims in the water-scarce American West.121 The prior appropriation 
doctrine developed against the backdrop of commercial/private 
tension, embodies deeply-rooted American ethical assumptions, and 
contemplates the “public ownership” of underlying land.122 The prior 
appropriation doctrine is also “a rule of scarcity, not plenty,” and is 
therefore concerned with managing limited resources.123 These features 
of the doctrine make it a useful comparison to the demands of outer 
space resource extraction. Most importantly, the prior appropriation 
doctrine has resulted in an intuitive set of rules distinguishing 
between ownership and productive use. 
 
118. See Reaven, supra note 105, at 251 (noting that CRAMRA 
demonstrated that “a significant portion” of the international 
community desired to effectively regulate mineral resource activities).  
119. Michael Arthur et al., Doctrine of Prior Appropriation, PENNSTATE, 
https://www.e-education.psu.edu/earth111/node/948 
[https://perma.cc/WZ5M-3PLM] (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
120. Collin Skocik, Planetary Resources’ Arkyd-6 Ready for Launch, 
SPACEFLIGHT INSIDER (Dec. 27, 2017), 
http://www.spaceflightinsider.com/missions/commercial/arkyd-6-ready-
for-launch/ [https://perma.cc/FX5Y-KLJS]. 
121. See David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice 
in the Creation of Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L. Q. 3, 7-8 (2005) 
(“When it came to resolving disputes over water use, the miners, finding 
the eastern law of riparian rights unsuited to the exigencies of their 
environment, applied the rules they had created for mining claims to 
surface water claims...[a]pplying the miners’ rules to water rights 
provided security of title to those displaying the entrepreneurial 
initiative necessary to make the earliest claims on the water, thereby 
facilitating economic expansion.”). 
122. See id. at 41. 
123. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Reviving the Public Ownership, Antispeculation, 
and Beneficial Use Moorings of Prior Appropriation Water Law, 84 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 97, 111 (2013). 
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The prior appropriation doctrine grew out of the chaos and grit 
that embodied the mining rush to the Western United States.124 The 
unpredictable availability of water, combined with the need for a 
simple adjudicative system, led early miners and farmers to adopt an 
“intuitive common sense” system of rules to resolve water claims.125 
Essentially, the first claimant to make actual beneficial use of the 
water has senior rights to later users.126 Claimants do not own the 
land, however, but rather the right to use the water.127 Consequently, 
claimants may transfer their rights to the use but the public 
ultimately owns the water.128 Each of these features is explored below.  
Central to the prior appropriation doctrine, and exemplified in 
Colorado’s constitution, is that water is a publicly owned resource.129 
This concept stands in contrast to the idea that ownership of land is 
tied to ownership of the land’s water.130 The prior appropriation 
doctrine severs those concepts from one another, justifying citizens’ 
right to appropriate water while nullifying riparian claims.131 This 
feature is a doctrinal cornerstone of the prior appropriation system, as 
it distributes ultimate decision-making authority to the public while 
protecting valid claims.  
Not all claimants establish or retain valid claims to use diverted 
water. Prior appropriation requires a claimant to make actual 
beneficial use of the water to obtain and retain their right to continue 
 
124. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric, 76 N. 
D. L. REV. 881, 890 (2000) (“Western water rights were initially a 
practical, intuitive response to the seasonable unreliability of western 
stream flows.”). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 882. 
127. See Schorr, supra note 121, at 42 (“Only the right to use could be 
acquired, and then only under conditions stipulated by the owner 
(through its agent, the state).”). 
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 41 (“The water of every natural stream, not heretofore 
appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the 
property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the 
people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.”) 
(citing COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5). 
130. See id. at 62 (“[W]ater’s special value in the west elevates it to a 
‘distinct’ estate, i.e. one not related to the rights of riparian landowners, 
not ‘a mere incident to the soil.’”). 
131. This is doctrinally distinct from the premise that water is available as a 
result of it being “unowned.” See, e.g., id. at 42 (“Opening up the 
opportunity to acquire a water right to all members of the public was 
not, as one might have expected, based on a theory of the water being 
res nullius, unowned, and therefore freely available to all. It was, rather, 
. . . . the property of the public, publici juris.”). 
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that use.132 In the context of the doctrine’s development, this 
stipulation prevented vast, speculative hoarding of property for the 
purpose of a later sale.133  This emphasis on “antispeculation” is 
derived from the era’s intensely anti-monopoly sentiment, favoring the 
distribution of water rights to those who could make actual use of the 
land.134 Therefore, claimants must define the location and expected 
scope of their use to establish or transfer rights.135  
Parties who establish valid claims are protected against other 
future users who seek to use the same water at the earlier claimant’s 
detriment. Parties who make actual beneficial use of water have 
“seniority” over later claimants who use the water for similar 
purposes.136 In this system of senior and junior claimants, the latter 
must yield their use to senior claimants in times of water scarcity.137 
Although this arrangement protects senior claimants from losing their 
use in times of scarcity, one scholar notes that claims often avoid 
their seniority.138 Furthermore, some states simply prohibit senior 
claimants from enforcing their priority over junior claimants when 
 
132. See id. at 21 (stating that water claims are only valid under the prior 
appropriation doctrine “. . . . as long as used and, in a further instance 
of the sufficiency principle, an exception was made only for the 
proprietor who was taking active steps toward construction of his mill, 
and only for as long as necessary to procure the necessary equipment.”). 
133. See id. at 21-22. (“The function of the work or use requirement was, 
rather, to prevent speculative appropriations; in other words, 
appropriations intended not for immediate use but for resale at a profit, 
especially by absentee owners.”). 
134. See id. at 27-28 (“‘[M]onopoly’ became something of an epithet for all 
the institutions agrarian reformers disliked or feared. It also had a more 
specific sense, referring to the accumulation of property on a scale 
beyond what was practical for personal use, particularly for purposes of 
speculation or deriving income from tenants. . . . . Anti-monopolism 
went hand-in-hand with a desire for limits to the private accumulation 
of land and the yeoman ideal of wide distribution to actual settlers.”). 
135. Claimants who fail to identify the nature of their use compromise the 
validity of their claim and ability to transfer that right to another party.  
See, e.g., Hobbs, supra note 123, at 128 (use applications dismissed 
when claimants fail to sufficiently identify the “need, amount, or place” 
of the use). 
136. Junior claimants who use water for “essential” purposes, however, are 
sometimes capable of supplanting senior rights. See Schorr, supra note 
121, at 23 (prior appropriation does not prohibit “domestic” uses from 
taking priority over agricultural uses even when the domestic use was 
not first in time). 
137. See Tarlock, supra note 124, at 882. 
138. One reason for avoiding enforcement is that water users are often 
“repeat users” and senior claimants are therefore incentivized not to 
compromise those relationships. Id. at 883. 
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doing so would be futile.139 Claimants may actually benefit from 
avoiding enforcement, especially when enforcement is sought solely to 
prove seniority at the expense of junior claimants.140 
Because prior appropriation separates the ownership of land from 
rights to beneficial use of water, claimants can freely transfer their 
validly established water rights.141 The technology claimants use to 
divert water for “out-of-stream” uses, like mining and agriculture, 
helps make the use “measurable and enforceable,” and therefore 
identifiable for transfer.142 Although transfers require new users to 
satisfy the actual beneficial-use requirement, the arrangement is 
flexible enough to facilitate the temporary transfer of use rights.143  
The prior appropriation’s system of senior and junior claimants is 
enforced and regulated by a centralized authority. Acting in a 
“trusteeship role,” the government is responsible for enforcing validly 
established water rights.144 Although enforcement is sometimes 
avoided, as noted above, the value of a senior claim is necessarily 
dependent on the enforcement of those rights, especially when water 
is in short supply.145 In addition to adjudicating claims, the 
government is responsible for the “conservation of the public’s water 
resources.”146 Here, the implications of the “public ownership” concept 
is significant: 
…[T]he state assumed a trusteeship role to administer the waters 
of the state for the benefit of the public. As such, it became 
responsible not only for minimal administrative functions but 
also for administration of the kind a trustee owes to the 
beneficiary of the trust. Its responsibilities include, first and 
foremost, the conservation of the estate and avoidance of waste; 
second, the promotion of beneficial use by assisting the 
 
139. Id. at 882. 
140. For the retelling of an incident in Aspen, Colorado, arising from a senior 
claimant’s erection of a damn to prove their senior rights, see id. at 899 
(Junior claimants may have a legally unjustified expectation that senior 
claimants will share in time of scarcity even though there is no 
“reasonableness” requirement in priority enforcement). 
141. Dan Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 
J. L. & ECON. 393, 427 (1995) (noting that prior appropriation “allows 
transfer of these water rights separate from any land…”).   
142. Id. at 428. 
143. See Hobbs, supra note 123, at 131 (temporary transfers are particularly 
flexible when made from agricultural to municipal uses on a “contract 
basis”).  
144. Id. at 109. 
145. Id. at 111. 
146. Id. at 109. 
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appropriator in achieving use objectives to the maximum extent 
feasible; third, the representation of beneficiaries in a parens 
patriae capacity and maintaining the use regimen on the river 
system; and fourth, the promotion of efficiency and prudence of 
the kind expected of a trustee.147 
The prior appropriation doctrine serves as a unique example for 
space law because of how it conceptualizes land ownership. 
Underlying land is available for use not because it is “unowned,” but 
because it is owned by a community who has the right to make 
productive use of it.148 Because the community owns the land, 
claimants have an obligation to use the land properly and the 
government is responsible for stewardship.149 This framing fits neatly 
with proponents of the idea that outer space is collectively “owned” 
by the international community. Regardless, stewardship and 
government ownership do not necessarily displace the potential for 
productive use.  
Parties do not violate the non-appropriation principle simply by 
extracting—or as here, diverting—resources from the land. At no 
point does extraction equate to a sovereign claim over the land. In 
instances where non-productive use or the like violates those 
principles, property rights disappear. Furthermore, the OST 
encourages the idea that outer space is to be used to benefit the 
broader international community.150 The prior appropriation doctrine 
illustrates that parties can establish and transfer robust property 
rights in resources independent from land-ownership, while promoting 
beneficial use. 
Conclusion 
The non-appropriation doctrine restricts parties from making 
sovereign claims over underlying land—the same restriction embedded 
in each of previous section’s legal regimes. Without violating the non-
appropriation principle, those regimes grant parties the right to 
extract resources from land they do not own, transfer that right, and 
limit wasteful use. Each system similarly vests an entity with the 
authority to regulate and enforce those rules. With some tailoring, 
 
147. Id. at 110 (citing The Water Right Determination and Administration 
Act of 1969, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 373, 200). 
148. See Schorr, supra note 121, at 42. 
149. Id. 
150. OST, supra note 7, at art. I (“The exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for 
the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their 
degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province 
of all mankind.”). 
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those rules could graft onto the uniqueness of outer space resource 
extraction.  
The property regimes explored in Part II do not provide answers 
for all claims likely to arise in cases involving outer space resource 
extraction. One looming issue is that some attempts at resource 
extraction are bound to straddle the line between use and sovereign 
claims over land. For example, in instances where parties continually 
seek extensions on mining permits (to the exclusion of others) or take 
blatant steps to unreasonably exclude other parties from nearby 
locations. Those seeking to preserve the line between use and 
ownership would be wise to police it. Answers to these granular 
regulatory questions will require some regulatory flexibility, but these 
issues are only different in scale from those addressed by our existing 
property regimes. 
At least one author explicitly criticizes what they describe as 
attempts to “merely superimpose an earth-based system of rules and 
regulations on the realm of space.”151 This reasoning is rooted in the 
observation that Antarctica and the high seas are property regimes 
“inexorably…linked to the Earth itself,” reflecting the idea that “a 
landowner has dominion from the depths of the Earth to the stars 
above.”152 This is a curious observation, as the laws governing the 
seas and Antarctica conceive of land ownership as separate from non-
wasteful use of that land. In fact, UNCLOS, CRAMRA, and the prior 
appropriation doctrine all distinguish between land ownership and 
resource extraction. Existing property regimes reflect attempts to 
balance a universal set of competing demands—specifically, issues of 
cost and benefit. Policy-makers should be encouraged to innovate 
effective rules for outer space resource extraction, but our legal system 
reflects fundamentally human issues that are here to stay. Regardless 
of analogous regimes, the OST’s language reflects a consciousness of 
these issues. 
Looking to earth-based property regimes is not merely a 
“misdirected” or “convoluted” attempt to avoid applying the non-
appropriation principle.153 Rather, parties to the OST should adhere 
to the non-appropriation principle. In its current form, the OST is 
flexible enough to permit nuanced and useful developments in space 
law; it does not need to be re-tooled to be amenable to outer space 
resource extraction. Consequently, the non-appropriation principle 
should not be interpreted as a death-knell for resource extraction, but 
a functional starting point permitting a robust system of rights and 
responsibilities. 
 
151. See Tennen, supra note 50, at 797. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 798. 
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This Note does not support the re-packaging of an existing 
property regime for use in space law. Rather, that existing property 
regimes, discussed in Part II, begin from the same premise as the non-
appropriation principle. Those property regimes are therefore useful 
for determining whether there is a place for resource extraction within 
a system that bans sovereign claims. While this Note does not explore 
what a regulatory system for outer space resource extraction should 
include, the first step in that process is to clear away doubts 
concerning the non-appropriation principle. There are, as other legal 
regimes show, distinctions between land ownership and use. Because 
extraction falls into the latter category, it alone should not bar the 
future plans of businesses like Planetary Resources and Deep Space 
Industries. 
Despite the non-appropriation principle’s workability, there may 
be other obstacles to resource extraction. Just as ideological 
disagreements created splintered legal regimes for seabed extraction, 
and environmental concerns halted commercial mining in Antarctica, 
any number of political issues could halt recent advances. 
Furthermore, non-appropriation is not the only principle governing 
numerous and complex international laws, all of which could provide 
separate obstacles to outer space mining. But, in light of the 
international community’s demonstrable ability to respond to 
challenges and create workable legal regimes in the face of 
uncertainty, this author is optimistic that those same traits will 
manifest themselves once again. After all, the challenges we face in 
outer space are only variations of the ones we have faced before. 
 
 
